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CASTLE IN THE AIR:  
A DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM FOR SPECTRUM 
By Kevin Werbach* 
 
This article envisions the foundational infrastructure for a true wireless 
Internet. The domain name system (DNS) for addressing allowed the Internet to 
scale as a decentralized, loosely-coupled system. A similar system for the 
wireless communication would allow devices to negotiate frequently 
assignments and other attributes dynamically.  The traditional, static approach 
to spectrum allocation creates massive inefficiencies, which will become 
increasingly problematic as wireless demand grows.  A DNS for spectrum could 
be based on the database the Federal Communications Commission recently 
mandated for devices operating in the “White Spaces” around broadcast 
television channels. Such an infrastructure would enable rapid growth and 
innovation in next-generation mobile devices and applications. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1980s, the Internet faced a problem.  The network of networks 
was growing rapidly… too rapidly.  The increasing number of connected systems 
was overwhelming the simple system that tracked Internet host addresses.   A 
single, static list couldn’t keep up with the growing complexity and fluidity of the 
Internet. The solution, defined in 1983, was an elegant mechanism called the 
domain name system (DNS).1  The DNS established a separate, distributed 
system for dynamic management of Internet addresses.  Every time you type the 
uniform resource locator (URL) of a website or send an email message, you 
                                                        
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. Contact: werbach@wharton.upenn.edu.  Thanks to the participants in the 
Maturing Internet Studies workshop at Northwestern Law School, and especially its organizer 
Jim Speta, for helpful comments. 
1 Paul Mockapetris, Domain names -- Concepts and Facilities, RFC 882 (November 1983); 
Paul Mockapetris, Domain names -- Implementation and Specification, RFC 883 (November 
1983). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557244
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invoke the DNS.  More than twenty-five years later, through massive growth and 
development of the Internet, the DNS continues to function effectively.  
Today, wireless communication faces a similar problem.  The rapidly 
increasing volume of traffic, as well as the growing number and sophistication of 
devices, threaten to overwhelm the simple, static spectrum allocation system 
managed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and other 
government agencies.  Command-and-control allocation of frequencies is wildly 
inefficient.  As wireless data connections become increasingly common, the 
absence of a dynamic spectrum allocation mechanism becomes an increasingly 
severe restraint on the evolution of the Internet into a ubiquitous mobile 
platform.   
The answer is a solution similar to the DNS: a hierarchical distributed 
database that brokers among those seeking and providing access to spectrum.  
The foundations for such a system are being laid today, without policy-makers 
realizing it.  The FCC voted in late 2008 to authorize unlicensed wireless “White 
Space Devices” (WSD), subject to the creation of a database of available 
transmission slots throughout the country.  This White Space Database could be 
the foundation for a Spectrum Networking Database (SND) that plays a DNS-like 
role in wireless communication.  To achieve its potential, however, such a system 
would need to address both technical and policy requirements.  Successful 
deployment of an SND would facilitate the continued development of a 
ubiquitous wireless Internet. 
I. SCALING: WIRELESS AND THE INTERNET 
A. The Spectrum Challenge 
As billions of mobile phones gain increasingly sophisticated data capabilities, 
and trillions of wireless sensors are integrated with physical spaces and objects, 
conventional approaches to spectrum management will crumble.  Current 
spectrum policy debates focus on initial allocations, such as the rules and auction 
in 2008 for licenses in the 700 MHz band reclaimed from UHF television 
stations.2 The real challenge, however, comes in implementation.  The only way 
to meet growing wireless capacity demands will be to view the spectrum as an 
ocean of potential capacity, theoretically available to any local device at any time. 
No centralized mechanisms, whether publicly or privately determined, can be 
                                                        
2 In re Serv. Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 & 777-792 MHz Bands, 22 F.C.C.R. 15289 (Aug. 
10, 2007) (second report and order) 
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sufficiently dynamic and localized for such a roiling ocean of wireless 
communication.  
To a first approximation, the future of the Internet is wireless.  Today, there 
are over 225 million mobile broadband users worldwide.3  That number nearly 
doubled from 2008 to 2009.4  For telephone service, there are already more than 
twice as many users of mobile phones as landlines worldwide.  That means more 
than two billion people who today own a mobile phone have never owned a 
personal computer – and may never do so.  
For most of its history, the Internet was primarily delivered to end users 
through wired network connections.  Wireless systems simply did not offer the 
capacity and stability of their wired cousins, such as the landline telephone 
network and coaxial cable television connections.  Until the past decade, high-
speed wireless data systems and the mobile devices to make use of them simply 
were not available.5   
In recent years, there has been an explosion of growth in wireless data.  
Unlicensed wireless hotspots using the WiFi and related protocols for short range 
connection have rapidly proliferated, as have laptops and other devices with the 
capability to make use of these networks.6  Wide-area wireless data services for 
the commercial market became feasible with latter version of digital mobile 
phone technology (so-called 2.5G systems), and have taken off with the growth of 
third-generation 3G mobile wireless technologies. In the US, all the major 
wireless carriers including Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and T-Mobile now offer 
nationwide wireless data coverage, with downstream speeds over one megabit 
per-second. New entrants such as Clearwire promise even faster data speeds. 
All this mobile data growth is causing huge increases in demand for wireless 
capacity.  The change is not merely in the absolute numbers, but in the quality of 
usage.  Apple’s phenomenally successful iPhone is the best example.7  The iPhone 
connects to the same networks as other mobile phones, but it encourages much 
more active usage because it provides a “real” Internet experience.  Google found 
the average iPhone user searched the Web fifty times more frequently than users 
of less-capable phones.8  In the first few weeks after Apple introduced the iPhone 
                                                        
3 See Nick Wood, Global Mobile Broadband Subscriptions Near Quarter of a Billion, TOTAL 
TELECOM, July 22, 2009, at http://www.totaltele.com/view.aspx?ID=447509. 
4 See id. 
5 Wireless data networks began to be deployed in the 1980s for special-purpose applications, 
such as paging and fleet dispatch services.  Metricom’s Ricochet system provided end-user 
wireless data service beginning in 1994, but it was a proprietary offering with limited speed 
and coverage area, which never gained significant traction.    
6 See Wi-Fi: It’s Fast, it’s Here – and it Works, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 3, 2002. 
7 Leslie Cauley, iPhone Gulps AT&T Network Capacity, USA TODAY, June 17, 2009. 
8 Maija Palmer and Paul Taylor, Google Homes in on Revenues from Phones, FT.COM, Feb. 13, 
2008, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/667f13de-da60-11dc-9bb9-0000779fd2ac.html. 
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3GS, featuring enhanced video recording capabilities, YouTube saw mobile video 
uploads increase 400%.9  
The iPhone is not an outlier; it is a harbinger of things to come.  AT&T 
Wireless predicts that broadband wireless data capacity demands will increase by 
a factor of 250 to 600 times between 2008 and 2018.10  More efficient 
technologies will provide some increase in capacity.  For example, fourth-
generation wireless systems such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) and WiMax 
promise to deliver greater capacity in the same spectrum as current 3G systems.  
These upgrades alone, however, will never match the scope of increased demand 
that is forecasted. 
Adding new capacity by allocating licenses to new spectrum bands is also not 
a viable long-term solution.  There have been no significant usable “empty” 
frequency bands for some time.  The “low-hanging fruit” for clearing small-scale 
incumbent uses to reallocate frequencies for more valuable broadband data uses 
has already been tapped.11 
The terrible irony is that spectrum utilization today is wildly inefficient.12  
Spectrum is not actually scarce, at least not to anywhere near the extent it 
seems.13  The frequency allocation table shows a dense checkerboard.  However, 
measurements of actual wireless activity show a radically different picture:  Most 
frequency bands are not actually used for transmission most of the time, in most 
places.  In fact, a study of wireless utilization in the frequencies below 3 GHz 
showed that only about five percent of bands were in use, on average.14  Even in 
                                                        
9 YouTube Blog, YouTube Mobile Uploads Up 1700% in 6 Months; 400% Since iPhone 3GS 
Release, at http://www.youtube.com/blog?entry=kbaLH7fmm-g. 
10 Rysavy Research, Mobile Broadband Spectrum Demand, Dec. 2008, at 12. 
11 See Susan P. Crawford, The Radio and The Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 934 
(2008) (calling the January 2008 auction of 700 MHz frequencies, “probably the last 
competitive auction for a substantial amount of spectrum for the next few decades….”). 
12 See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless 
Communication, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 863 (2004); Phil Weiser, The Untapped Potential of 
Wireless Spectrum, Brookings Institute Report, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/07_wireless_weiser.aspx; Victor Pickard and 
Sascha D. Meinrath, “Revitalizing the Public Airwaves: Opportunistic Reuse of Government 
Spectrum,” Wireless Future Working Paper, New America Foundation (June 2009), 
forthcoming in International Journal of Communications (2009).   
13 See Supercommons, supra note 12. 
14 See Mark McHenry, Dupont Circle Spectrum Utilization During Peak Hours, A 
Collaborative Effort of The New America Foundation and The Shared Spectrum Company, 
New America Foundation Issue Brief (2003), available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/Doc_File_183_1.pdf; Mark McHenry, NSF 
Spectrum Occupancy Measurements: Project Summary, Shared Spectrum Company (August 
2005)), available at http://www.sharedspectrum.com/measurements/.  
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New York City, the most densely populated metropolitan area, the number was 
only thirteen percent.15 
The reality is that most spectrum licensees do not, or cannot, use their 
frequencies in anywhere near the most efficient possible manner.16  In some cases 
this is due to the inflexibility of FCC licenses and the legacy characteristic of old 
systems.  For example, broadcast television allocations were made in the 1940s.  
They required a substantial percentage of the frequencies to be dark as guard 
bands, because receivers were not sophisticated enough to distinguish signals 
otherwise.17  
Both the demand and the supply of spectrum are inherently local, short-term 
phenomena.18  Whether one system can transmit without inhibiting the ability of 
other systems to do so depends on a multitude of factors, including the technical 
characteristics of the transmitters and receivers; the nature of the services 
involved; and the physical geography of the area.  And the situation will change 
over time.  The wireless capacity that is “wasted” is bounded by time, geography, 
and technical characteristics.  It cannot be specified globally for all time.  Only a 
system with up-to-date local information can identify the full opportunity space 
for wireless communication. 
The existing spectrum allocation structure is so inefficient because it is 
inherently static and centralized.  Whether a device in Omaha, Nebraska can 
transmit at ten watts of power at 488 MHz (UHF television channel 17) at 
2:00pm this Thursday is a determined by a decades-old table of frequency 
allocations issued by the FCC.19  The frequency table answers the question of who 
is legally permitted to transmit in a designated frequency band across a large 
geographic area.  It does not address two more important questions: who is 
actually transmitting in those frequencies, and who else could transmit without 
disturbing the licensee.   
                                                        
15 See id. And this was during the Republican National Convention in New York, a time of 
extremely high wireless use. 
16 The FCC itself acknowledges that we face not a spectrum capacity problem, but a spectrum 
access problem.  See Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum Policy Task Force 
Report, ET Docket No. 02-135 (November, 2002), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/reports.html. 
17 See Randy Hoffner, White Space Devices: Threat to Broadcast TV?, TV Tech., Dec. 5, 2007, 
at http://www.tvtechnology.com/pages/s.0079/t.10086.html; Sascha D. Meinrath & Michael 
Calabrese, White Space Devices” & the Myths of Harmful Interference, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL'Y 495 (2008).  
18 See Supercommons, supra note 12. 
19 Moreover, spectrum allocations until recently were specific as to service.  A television 
broadcaster cannot decide its license would be more efficiently or profitably used to offer 
mobile data services; it must operate a broadcast system or nothing at all. 
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The static spectrum allocation system is a historical artifact.  Until recently, 
wireless systems generally lacked the ability to sense the environment around 
them.  They could merely transmit or receive in a narrow range of frequencies, 
using specific waveforms.  A television receiver, for example, could only look for 
television transmitters with sufficient signal strength to reach it.  In the case of 
older services such as television, those receivers were assumed to be very poor by 
today’s standards at identifying the relevant signals.  As a result, huge swaths of 
spectrum were designated as buffer space between allocated frequencies.  All 
those decisions were made centrally, by the FCC.  It issued licenses that 
authorized certain transmitters and forbid all others.     
This “command and control” spectrum allocation process was workable when 
wireless communications systems were limited, but breaks down today.  When 
wireless networks were predominantly one-way, large-area, fixed radio and 
television systems or point-to-point relays, and overall wireless demand was 
small compared to the present, the inefficiencies were relatively small.  The 
higher the level of demand, and the more dynamic the systems involved, the less 
a command-and-control approach can approach optimal efficiency.  In a world of 
ubiquitous wireless broadband, the viability of the existing spectrum allocation 
process is increasingly called into question.20 
The only viable solution for the wireless capacity crunch is therefore a 
distributed one.  Spectrum allocation decisions must be made locally and for 
limited durations.  Cellular phone systems already do something like this in their 
licensed spectrum, dynamically allocating capacity to handsets within range of 
towers.  The operator cannot anticipate all possible usage scenarios ahead of 
time; it allocates some decision-making to software in each base station.  
However, the cellular example is very limited.  Cellular networks operate in 
defined licensed spectrum bands for the purpose of supporting a particular 
uniform service, with the ability to control handset technology directly.   
The two main proposals for significant reform of spectrum allocation both 
employ dynamic, local decision-making.21  Under the “property” approach, 
spectrum licensees would be granted property rights to use or sell their spectrum 
as they pleased.22  This approach traces its intellectual history to a famous 1959 
                                                        
20 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 239 (MIT Press 2005). 
21 For a comparison of property and commons models for spectrum, See Supercommons, 
supra note 12; Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the 
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 287 (1998); Gerald R. Faulhaber & 
David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons 
(working paper), at 
http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~faulhabe/SPECTRUM_MANAGEMENTv51.pdf; Eli Noam, 
The Fourth Way for Spectrum, FT.com, May 29, 2003, at 
http://news.ft.com/comment/columnists/neweconomy. 
22 See Supercommons, supra note 12. 
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article by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, urging the FCC to assign property rights 
rather than more-limited licenses.23  In a property system, decisions about what 
to do with frequency blocks devolve from a central government regulator to a 
collection of private owners.  These owners can make local decisions about use 
and access to their spectrum, including whether to sell that spectrum to another 
owner who values it more.   
The major alternative to the property approach, the so-called “commons” 
model, is even more distributed and dynamic.24  Under a commons approach, 
anyone can transmit, subject to technical standards.  Devices must negotiate 
themselves to avoid interference.  The best example in practice of this model is 
the WiFi technology operating in the 2.5 GHz and 5 GHz unlicensed bands.  
Millions of WiFi base stations offer short-range connections in homes and 
businesses, coexisting despite the absence of exclusive rights.25  The WiFi 
protocol allows individual devices to mitigate interference locally, and individual 
device owners can also coordinate transmission channels for more efficient 
operation.  As with the property approach, these decisions are superior to those 
of command-and-control allocation because they are made “on the ground” in 
response to local conditions, rather than being specified, indefinitely and ahead 
of time, by a central regulator. 
Technology is making such a dynamic spectrum allocation model feasible.  
Historically, wireless devices could only operate on a limited range of frequencies 
and transmit in very specific ways.26  These characteristics had to be defined 
when the device was built, and built into the physical hardware.  Moreover, 
devices had little or no ability to understand the local spectral environment.  
Numerous technical advances are changing radios into something entirely 
different: adaptable connected digital platforms.27  Wireless devices today can be 
“tuned” to different frequencies and waveforms through software,28 and can 
manage interference through power limits or technical protocols.   These 
                                                        
23 Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1959). 
24 See Supercommons, supra note 12.  
25 See supra note 6. 
26 See Supercommons, supra note 12; Kevin Werbach, Radio Revolution, New America 
Foundation Working Paper (2002). 
27 See Radio Revolution, supra note 26; Supercommons, supra note 12; Preston F. Marshall, A 
Potential Alliance for World-Wide Dynamic Spectrum Access, New America Foundation 
Wireless Future Program Issue Brief #25, June 2009; Crawford, supra note 11. 
28 See William Lehr, et al., Software Radio: Implications for Wireless Services, Industry 
Structure, and Public Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Program on Internet and 
Telecoms Convergence (August 2002), at http://itc.mit.edu; Authorization and Use of 
Software Defined Radios First Report and Order, 16F.C.C.R. 17373 (2001); Spectrum Policy 
Task Force Report, ET Docket No. 02-135, Comments of Vanu, Inc. at 1-2. 
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developments allow for a grand shift of spectrum utilization from static to 
dynamic.29 
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) means that wireless devices could transmit 
based on actual availability of capacity rather than pre-set rules of exclusive 
frequency allocation.30  DSA techniques are the subject of extensive technical 
research today.31 DARPA, the research and development arm of the US 
Department of Defense, funded significant development work on adaptive radio 
technologies which could be employed for DSA through it XG program.32  
Academics have suggested technical rules and pricing mechanisms for 
“secondary” users to access licensed spectrum on an as-need and as-available 
basis.33  Even Google has entered the fray, proposing continuous real-time 
auctions for spectrum capacity, analogous to the way it sells advertising on its 
search engine.34 
The limitation of all these proposals is the absence of a coordination 
mechanism.  Each envisions a particular DSA mechanism for a particular 
purpose, even though the DSA concept is potentially applicable to the entire 
usable spectrum.35  What is needed is a way to “flip the switch” from the static to 
the dynamic paradigm.  The missing piece for far-reaching spectrum reform is a 
meta-infrastructure with the capacity to incorporate virtually all forms of 
dynamic access, and both the property and commons allocation mechanisms.  
The criteria for this notional spectrum meta-infrastructure bear a striking parallel 
to an existing resource: the Internet’s domain name system. 
B. Lessons from Internet Addressing 
                                                        
29 See Radio Revolution, supra note 26. 
30 See John Chapin & William Lehr, The Path to Market Success for Dynamic Spectrum 
Access Technologies, IEEE COMMS, May 2007, at 96; Qing Zhao & Brian Sadler, A Survey of 
Dynamic Spectrum Access, IEEE SIGNAL PROCESSING, May 2007, at 79; Marshall, supra note 
27. 
31 See Douglas Sicker, The Technology of Dynamic Spectrum Access and its Challenges, IEEE 
COMMS., JUNE 2007, AT 48. IEEE Communications, a leading technical journal in the field, 
devoted a special issue to the topic in 2007, and research has only intensified since then. See 
id. 
32 See Christian Bourge, New Tech Feeds Spectrum Debate, WIRELESS NEWSFACTOR, June 30, 
2003, at http://www.wirelessnewsfactor.com/perl/story/21828.html. 
33 See Jon Peha and Sooksan Panichpapiboon, Real-Time Secondary Markets for Spectrum, 
TELECOMMS. POL’Y, Aug.-Sept. 2004, at 603. 
34 John Markoff, Google Proposes Innovation in Radio Spectrum Auction, N.Y. Times, May 
22, 2007. 
35 One exception is spectrum dedicated for radio astronomy, where any radiated energy 
interferes with scientific research. 
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Every computer network must have an addressing system.  Witout unique 
addresses, data could not flow from one point to another.  On a single network, 
addresses can be assigned and managed centrally, because one authority controls 
all aspects of the system.  The Internet, however is a network of networks.36  
There is no central regulator. Addresses must be assigned by agreement of the 
network operators or users.  Remarkably, the Internet developed an addressing 
structure that is robust, scalable, and flexible, despite these limitations.  That 
infrastructure is the domain name system (DNS). 
The original Internet addressing mechanism was called the host name table.  
In those days, prior to the mid-1980s, machines were directly connected to the 
network, generally at universities or other research and government institutions. 
Addresses were maintained in a single flat text file, maintained by a graduate 
student named Jon Postel.37  As the Internet grew, this simple mechanism 
became unworkable.  The DNS was developed in 1983 by Paul Mockapetris to 
replace it.38 
The technical requirements and applications of the DNS were spelled out in a 
series of protocol documents that were revised over time.39  There are many 
aspects to the DNS, but at its core, the DNS is a special kind of database. Paul 
Vixie, a long-time technical expert on Internet addressing, has called it “a 
distributed, coherent, reliable, autonomous, hierarchical database, the first and 
only one of its kind.”40 The DNS establishes a “domain name space” of 
hierarchical zones, each served by an authoritative nameserver.  For example, the 
domain name “en.wikipedia.org” means the English-language sub-domain of the 
Wikipedia domain, which is part of the .org (organization) generic top-level 
category within the DNS.  Information is cached and replicated both horizontally 
– across multiple “root servers” or parallel local nameservers – and vertically – 
from a higher-level server down to sub-domains.  
Functionally, the DNS can be thought of as providing two interfaces: a “front-
end” resolution service for end-users, and a “back-end” registration service for 
network-connected resources.  For end-users, the DNS seamlessly connects 
                                                        
36 Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the 
Forces Tearing it Apart, __ U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009). 
37 Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You - Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: 
What We Can Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the 
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, at 169 (2001); Brett M. Frischmann, 
Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market 
Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, COLUM. SCI.  & 
TECH. L. REV. (2001). 
38 See Kesan and Shah, supra note 37. 
39 Jon Postel, RFC 1591: Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (Mar. 1994), at 
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt; ELLEN RONY  & PETER RONY, THE DOMAIN NAME 
HANDBOOK (1998).   
40 Paul Vixie, DNS Complexity, ACM QUEUE, April 2007. 
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human-readable domain names such as icanhascheezburger.com with the 
numerical Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that the network’s routers 
understand.41  For those who wish to be reached, the DNS provides a mechanism 
to request a name, verify its availability, and associate it with an individual or 
organization.   
As the DNS evolved, three distinct components developed: registries, 
registrars, and resolvers.  A registry is the authoritative database for a top-level 
segment of the DNS, such as .com or .cz.  It maintains the records of which names 
map to which IP addresses, and the official contact points for that registration. 
Registrars interface directly with those who wish to register names.  The registrar 
function was originally combined with that of the registry, but at least for the 
generic top-level domains such as .com and .org, there is now competition among 
authorized registrars.42  Finally, individual devices and service providers can 
operate local resolvers that match a user’s request for an address with the entry 
specified in the registry.  The resolver usually operates on a local cached copy of 
the registry at the users Internet service provider. 
These concrete functions only partially capture the significance of the DNS.  
The unified addressing system is, on some level, what makes the Internet the 
Internet.43 Without the ability to know that en.wikipedia.org is the English-
language Wikipedia, there would be a collection of loosely connected private 
networks, rather than a single Internet.44 And the DNS serves as foundational 
infrastructure for new Internet applications and features, because it is so 
universal.45 
A review of the functions and history of the DNS reveals three key elements 
that allowed the system to scale effectively: resolution separated from 
transmission, distributed redundancy, and governance separated from 
technology. 
First, the DNS is a specialized piece of Internet infrastructure.  Its only 
function is to resolve addresses.  The protocols for encoding and transmitting 
data packets are completely separate, as are those defining particular applications 
                                                        
41 This served three purposes: people remember names better than numbers, the names can 
stay stable when the numbers (tied to network topology) change, and allowed a single host to 
correspond to multiple network addresses.  See Jon Klensin, Role of the Domain Name Systm 
(DNS), RFC 3467, Feb. 2003, at 3. 
42 This was a significant outcome of the transition of domain name governance to ICANN. See 
infra. 
43 “[T]he DNS provided critical uniqueness for names, and universal accessibility to them, as 
part of overall “single Internet” and “end to end” models….” See id. at 5. 
44 See Centripetal Network, supra note 36; Christopher Rhoads, Endangered Domain, WALL 
ST. JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 2006, at A1 . 
45 See Klensin, supra note  41, at 2 (“In recent years, the DNS has become a database of 
convenience for the Internet….”). 
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such as the World Wide Web and voice communication.46  This separation helps 
the Internet to grow and develop.  Scaling the addressing system is a challenge 
for the addressing system, not for the operators or users of other components of 
the Internet.   
Second, as Paul Vixie noted, the DNS is a distributed, hierarchical, redundant 
system.47  There is one authoritative DNS database for each top-level domain, but 
that database exists in many places.  Billions of DNS queries take place every day, 
but the overwhelming majority do not go all the way to the central root servers.  
They are handled locally by caches and resolvers.   
Third, the DNS is agnostic to how names are used. The DNS is a technical 
creation to manage an operational requirement of a network of networks.  
However, domain names are at the center of important policy and economic 
activities, which become increasingly significant as the Internet grows.  Domain 
names potentially intersect with the law of trademarks and defamation, for 
example.48 And the structure of the DNS shapes the degree to which the Internet 
is truly international, or inherently tilted toward the US and Western countries.49 
ICANN, the governance body established to oversee certain DNS management 
functions, has waded into all these disputes.   However, the technical architecture 
of the DNS has remained the same.  If the DNS does not solve all the non-
technical problems around Internet addressing, at least it permits the battles 
around them to be fought in non-technical domains. 
II. FROM WHITE SPACES TO SPECTRUM DNS 
The rudiments of a DNS for the wireless Internet are being developed as an 
outgrowth of the FCC’s decision to authorize unlicensed White Space Devices 
around former broadcast television bands.  To implement the White Spaces 
decision, the FCC required devices to query a real-time database of utilization in 
the relevant frequency bands.  Properly designed, this system could be the basis 
for a distributed dynamic routing database, analogous to the DNS on the wired 
Internet.   
                                                        
46 Applications can be assigned to port numbers, which are part of the larger Internet 
addressing system, if not the DNS itself.  And the DNS has a specialized component built in for 
email, known as the MX record. 
47 See Vixie, supra note 40. 
48 See generally MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT:  INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING 
OF CYBERSPACE (2002) (detailing the tortured history of domain name management); Kesan 
and Shah, supra note 37. 
49 See Centripetal Network, supra note 36; Geoff Huston, Addressing the Future of the 
Internet, ISP COLUMN, Feb. 2007, http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2007-02/address-
paper.html; 
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To achieve such a result, however, the database must not be limited to White 
Space devices alone.  The FCC and industry must also take care to avoid the 
mistakes and failings of the current DNS infrastructure. These include the 
imposition of artificial scarcities, the creation of a private monopolist, and the 
bureaucratization of technical management functions. The Internet may have 
been a happy accident, but there is no excuse today for ignoring the 
infrastructural demands of its next instantiation. 
A. The White Space Database 
The White Space Database presents a singular opportunity to apply the DNS 
model to wireless communication. When the FCC allocated spectrum for 
broadcast television in the 1940s, it deliberately left many channels dark to avoid 
interference.50  For example, channel 4 was licensed in New York but not in 
Philadelphia, and vice versa, so that receivers in each city would not become 
confused by overlapping signals.  Many other frequencies in the TV broadcast 
bands are un-used as interference protection,  Moreover, every available channel 
is not licensed in each city, and many licensees do not actually transmit, 
especially with most viewers receiving television content through cable or 
satellite connections rather than over the air.  A 2005 study by the public interest 
group Free Press confirmed that most TV broadcast channels are simply not in 
use.51   
These so-called TV White Spaces are perhaps the most egregious example of 
the inefficiency of the current spectrum allocation regime.52  They are considered 
“beachfront spectrum” because of their location on the frequency chart.  
Generally, the lower the frequency, the better the propagation of a wireless signal.  
A lower-frequency system can serve a larger geographic area and penetrate 
obstructions such as trees and building walls more easily than a higher-frequency 
system, all things being equal. Lower frequencies tend to be dedicated to older 
services, and thus are less likely to be made available for new systems.  The 
broadcast frequencies have the capability to support valuable wireless broadband 
services, and may be especially useful for delivering broadband connectivity in 
rural areas.53  
                                                        
50 See Meinrath & Calabrese, supra note 17; NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 20. 
51 See Free Press study, at http://www.freepress.net/docs/whitespace_analysis.pdf.  See also 
McHenry, supra note 14. 
52 The designation is something of a misnomer, as there is nothing inherently linking the 
subject frequencies to television broadcasting beyond historical legacy.  
53 See Crawford, supra note 11; Meinrath & Calabrese, supra note 17; Pierre de Vries, 
Populating the Vacant Channels: The Case for Allocating Unused Spectrum in the Digital TV 
Bands to Unlicensed Use for Broadband and Wireless Innovation (New Am. Found., Working 
Paper No. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaper14.DTVWhiteSpace.deVries.pdf; J.H. Snider, 
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In 2004, the FCC sought comment on whether to allow unlicensed devices to 
transmit in the TV White Spaces.54  Advocates and technical experts weighed in 
on both sides regarding the potential for interference.  Broadcasters expressed 
concern that unlicensed white space devices would harm TV reception.  
Manufacturers and users of wireless microphones which operate in these bands 
expressed similar objections.55  The FCC concluded in 2006 that unlicensed white 
space devices could operate without producing excessive interference.56  It 
initiated a testing process for prototype devices to verify this finding.57  
Companies such as Microsoft, Philips, and Motorola developed equipment The 
testing concluded in October 2008 with a finding that white space devices could 
detect and avoid nearby television systems and wireless microphones.58 
In November 2008, the FCC allocated the TV White Spaces for unlicensed 
use.59 However, important issues remain unresolved before the White Space 
order can go into effect.  The FCC left significant technical and implementation 
issues to a further stage of the proceeding.60 In March 2009, the incumbent TV 
broadcasters sued the FCC to overturn the decision.61  And during the same 
period, President Obama’s nominee as FCC Chairman, Julius Genachowski, took 
over for the Bush Administration’s Kevin Martin.   
There is at this moment, therefore, a significant opportunity to shape the 
White Space proceeding.  The FCC has expressed its intent to move forward, but 
the actual structure can still be shaped.  In parallel with the regulatory decisions, 
                                                        
Reclaiming the Vast Wasteland: The Economic Case for Re-Allocating the Unused Spectrum 
(White Space) Between TV Channels 2 and 51 to Unlicensed Service, New Am. Found., Feb. 
2006, available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/Doc File 2898 1.pdf. 
54 Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, ET Docket No. 04-186, FCC 04-113 
(2004). 
55 There are a handful of other authorized uses of the bands, including auxiliary transmission 
services for broadcasters and cable television head-end systems. 
56 First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in the Matter of 
Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, ET Docket No. 04-186 and 02-380, October 
18, 2006. 
57 See id. 
58 FCC Office of Engineering and Technology “Evaluation of the Performance of Prototype TV-
Band White Space Devices Phase II,” OET Report FCC/OET 08-TR-1005, Oc. 15, 2008, 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-08-2243A3.pdf. 
59 Federal Communications Commission, Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 
Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, ET Docket No. 04-186, ET 
Docket No. 02-380, FCC 08-2360 (released November 14, 2008) [White Spaces order]. 
60 See id.  
61 See Matthew Lasar, Broadcasters Sue FCC Over White Space Broadband Decision, ARS 
TECHNICA, March 3, 2009, at http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/03/broadcasters-sue-fcc-over-white-space-broadband-decision.ars. 
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the 802.22 subgroup of the IEEE is developing technical standards for devices 
that could operate in the White Spaces. 
The FCC’s November 2008 order introduced a new requirement of a database 
to protect against interference from white space devices.62  TV White Space 
devices would be required to incorporate geo-location capabilities, meaning they 
would have the ability to determine their physical location either directly or 
through communication with a fixed base station.63  Before transmitting, each 
device would have to check the White Space database to identify broadcasters 
and others operating in that area.64  This way, the device could be sure it was “in 
the clear” to use a vacant channel. 
The White Space Database emerged from the FCC proceeding as a pragmatic 
solution to a narrow concern, but has the potential to become something much 
greater.  The database was a response to broadcasters’ objections that regulators 
could not rely on the spectrum-sensing capabilities of White Space devices 
themselves to protect pre-existing users.  However, the few lines in the FCC order 
concerning the database leave open a great deal of room to determine how it 
should be structured, implemented, and governed.  The database will be a piece 
of software and networking infrastructure, analogous to the DNS.  And there is 
no fundamental reason it must be limited to broadcast white spaces.65 
A coalition called the White Space Database Group has taken the lead in 
recommending the architecture for the system.66  The group proposed a structure 
broadly similar to the DNS, with the possibility for distributed data storage and a 
split between registries and registrars (which it calls repositories and service 
providers), as well as the potential for dedicated resolvers (called query 
services).67   In short, the White Space Database could be the foundation for a 
DNS of wireless spectrum. 
B. Comparing Interference to Addressing 
Spectrum management and Internet addressing are both mechanisms for 
conflict resolution.  In wireless communication, the potential conflict is between 
                                                        
62 See White Spaces Order, supra note 59.  The order also encouraged other mechanisms such 
as spectrum sensing to prevent interference. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See Michael Calabrese, The End of Spectrum ‘Scarcity’: Building on the TV Bands Database 
to Access Unused Public Airwaves, New America Foundation Wireless Future Program 
Working Paper No. 25 (June 2009). 
66 See Ex Parte Filing of the White Spaces Database Group, in ET Docket No. 04-186, April 10, 
2009.  Membership in the group includes Comsearch, Dell, Fox, Google, Microsoft, Motorola, 
NCTA, sMSTV, NetLogix, Neustar and the Public Interest Spectrum Coalition.  
67 See id. 
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two systems that cannot effectively communicate at the same time, a 
phenomenon known as interference.68  In addressing, the conflict is between two 
systems that claim the same domain name.69  The DNS solves this conflict by 
authoritatively linking an Internet protocol address (which is itself tied to the 
physical topology of the network, and unique) with a domain name.70  The 
equivalent process for spectrum is usually handled by the FCC, through its 
command-and-control allocation of frequencies to designated licensees.71  
Although they serve the same basic function, the DNS and current spectrum 
management techniques do so in very different ways.  Spectrum management is 
prophylactic and fixed.  The government decides ahead of time how a set of 
frequencies can be used, and writes those into its licenses.  The DNS, on the other 
hand, does not associate a name to an IP address until the prospective user of 
that name registers it.  Registration only requires a check that the name is 
unassigned.  And the registration can be changed or transferred at any time.  This 
user-controlled system is therefore dynamic where traditional spectrum 
allocation is static and inefficient.72 
At first blush, there are substantial differences between the resolution 
function of domain names and spectrum management.73  “Interference” with a 
domain name means using the exact same string of alphanumeric characters.  
Two domain names that vary by a single character may co-exist without difficulty. 
With wireless systems, however, interference is a complex and contentious 
concept.74  Whether a system interferes is not a stable physical property; it 
depends on the system allegedly interfered with.75  The physics of wireless 
                                                        
68 As I explain in Supercommons, interference is something of a misnomer.  The wireless 
signals do not prevent each other from being received.  They make it difficult for one or both 
sets of devices to distinguish the desired signal from unrelated noise. See Supercommons, 
supra note 12. 
69  Addresses do not necessarily need to be globally unique to avoid this problem. DHCP and 
NATs allow a hierarchical structure where only a portion of the network is subject to DNS.  See 
text at note 81. 
70 The mapping need not be one-to-one.  Several domain names can be aliased to one IP 
address, or multiple IP addresses can be pointed to the same domain name. 
71 See Supercommons, supra note 12; Benkler, supra note 21; Noam, supra note 21; FCC 
Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16.  In unlicensed bands, the FCC establishes 
technical requirements for devices, which then manage interference locally. See Eli Noam, 
Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism: Taking the Next Step to 
Open Spectrum Access, 41 J. L. & ECON., 765 (1998).  
72 See Supercommons, supra note 12. 
73 Jim Speta first encouraged me to consider this point. 
74 See Supercommons, supra note 12; Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless 
Communications, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 25 (2002); David Weinberger, The Myth of 
Interference, SALON, Mar. 12, 2003, at 
http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/2003/03/12/spectrum/index.html. 
75 See Supercommons, supra note 12 
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communication produce many spillover effects between systems.76  This is further 
complicated by the nature of exclusive licenses.  Incumbent licensees have every 
incentive to make their devices cheap rather than robust to interference, and to 
use the regulatory process to claim interference is occurring.77  The battles over 
low-power FM radio and White Spaces show how intense these conflicts can 
become.78  A cursory duplication check and a simple first-in-time allocation rule, 
as the DNS uses, therefore do not suffice for wireless. 
On further examination, however, the lines are not so clean in the DNS case 
either.  Because domain names are human-readable strings, there are situations 
where a user may confuse them even if a computer does not.  This becomes 
important when a particular domain name has economic value associated with it.  
This is widely the case with commercial websites and those overlapping 
trademarks.79  Under both the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 
US law and the Uniform Dispute Resolution Process of ICANN, a registrant may 
be forbidden from using a domain name even if it is not identical to one already 
registered or trademarked.80  So-called “cybersquatting” that is malicious or 
creates consumer confusion is prohibited.  As the number of lawsuits in this area 
demonstrates, deciding when that has occurred is complicated and contentious.  
The analogy to spectrum interference debates is therefore not so far-fetched. 
At a technical level, the closest analogy between dynamic spectrum brokering 
and Internet addressing is DHCP, the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.81  
DHCP is one of many “hacks” to adapt the Internet architecture developed for 
small-scale research internetworking to the requirements of today’s commercial-
scale global infrastructure.82  Because of the technical characteristics of the 
Internet Protocol (IP) and historical address-allocation policies, most Internet 
service providers cannot easily give each of their customers a unique IP address.83 
Mobile access and nomadic connections to WiFi hotspots complicate the problem 
even further. The solution is to assign users an address dynamically from a 
                                                        
76 See id. 
77 See Supercommons, supra note 12. 
78 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, THE LOGIC OF SCARCITY: IDLE SPECTRUM AS A FIRST AMENDMENT 
VIOLATION, 52 Duke L.J. 1  (200) (lower power FM); supra note 53 (white spaces). 
79 See MUELLER, supra note 48. 
80 See Mueller, supra note 48; Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d); 
Patrick Kelley, Note, Emerging Patterns in Arbitration Under the Uniform Domain-Name 
Dispute-Resolution Policy, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 181. 
81 A. Michael Froomkin and Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, n.19 
(2003). TK -- analogy to DHCP in p. 4 of one of the technical papers below 
82 Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End-
to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE 
INTERNET AND BEYOND (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001); Upgrading 
the Internet, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2001, at 33, 34. 
83 See Centripetal Network, supra note 36. 
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common pool, each time they log on.  Even if they have a broadband connection, 
most residential users do not remain connected all the time.  DHCP makes 
dynamic IP address updates transparent to users. 
With DHCP, a relatively small pool of IP addresses can be shared by a 
relatively large pool of users.  Each user ties up an address only when he or she 
actually needs it.  This efficiency gain parallels the greater efficiency that a more 
dynamic structure could bring to spectrum allocation.  The problem with DHCP, 
and the related technique of Network Address Translation (NAT), is that they, as 
already noted, they were post-hoc hacks rather than core Internet infrastructure 
like the DNS.  Because DHCP allocates addresses locally, there is no uniform 
mechanism to associate users and addresses across the network.  This adds 
complexity to the Internet, and creates problems for some applications that 
would benefit from end-to-end visibility.84  A DNS for wireless communication 
would marry the efficiency gains of DHCP with the canonical reliability of DNS. 
As discussed below, conflict resolution is in truth only an intermediate 
function of both the DNS and spectrum allocation.85  Both the Internet address 
space and the spectrum are notional constructs only.86  Conflicts over names and 
frequencies are important only to the degree they have economic or social 
consequences.  A system that minimized conflicts and controversy, but too 
heavily constrained productive use of the resource in question, would be a poor 
tradeoff.  The ultimate goal of the DNS, as described above, was to scale the 
Internet.87  The ultimate goal of spectrum management should likewise be to 
scale wireless capacity.88 
The DNS, for its many flaws, has allowed the Internet to grow from a purely 
research-oriented system linking a few thousand networks in 1983 to the global 
backbone of commerce, entertainment, communication, and government activity 
in 2009.  To achieve something similar in spectrum requires an infrastructure for 
dynamic and distributed intermediation of spectrum allocation decisions, just as 
the DNS provides dynamic and distributed intermediation of address allocation 
decisions. 
                                                        
84 See Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 82. 
85 John Klensin, Role of the Domain Name System (DNS), RFC 3467, February 2003. 
86 That the DNS is an arbitrary system created by Internet protocol definitions should be 
obvious.  The illusory character of the spectrum is less intuitive, but equally accurate. See 
Supercommons, supra note 12. 
87 See supra. 
88 See Supercommons, supra note 12; Benkler, supra note 74. 
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III. THE SPECTRUM NETWORKING DATABASE 
A. How the System Would Work 
As has already been noted, a great deal of technical work is underway to 
facilitate real-time sharing of wireless capacity.  The next step is to envision an 
intermediary that would broker requests for secondary access.  A number of 
experts have incorporated some form of brokering into their technical protocols 
for dynamic spectrum access (DSA).89  Viewing the problem from the other 
direction, though, the brokering mechanism should be the primary infrastructure 
for spectrum allocation, with particular technical schemes for sharing as 
subsidiary elements.90  Putting the brokering engine at the center emphasizes the 
structural and policy elements to be addressed.  I call the universal brokering 
engine the SND, or spectrum networking database. 
The foundation for the SND is the reference architecture the White Spaces 
Database Group proposed to the FCC.91  This architecture involves three main 
elements: the repository, the registrar, and the query service.92  The repository 
would be the actual database of frequencies, locations, and authorized users.  It is 
analogous to the DNS “root” database of domain names.93  The repository would 
be fed from existing FCC spectrum allocation databases, such as the Universal 
Licensing Service (ULS), as well as from registrars.  Registrars would take in 
information from spectrum users.  One kind of users would be protected entities, 
                                                        
89 See, e.g., M. Buddhikot, et al, DIMSUMnet: new directions in wireless networking using 
coordinated dynamic spectrum, World of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks, 2005. 
WoWMoM 2005. Sixth IEEE International Symposium on a, 13-16 June 2005 Page(s):78 – 
85; T. Maseng & T. Ulversoy, Dynamic Frequency Broker and Cognitive Radio, Cognitive 
Radio and Software Defined Radios: Technologies and Techniques, 2008 IET Seminar on, 18-
18 Sept. 2008 Page(s):1 – 5; DSAP: a protocol for coordinated spectrum access, New Frontiers 
in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, 2005 First IEEE Dyspan International Symposium on 
8-11 Nov. 2005 Page(s):611 – 614; Q. Peng et al,  “A Distributed Spectrum Sensing Scheme 
Based on Credibility and Evidence Theory in Cognitive Radio Context”, 17th IEEE 
International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, 2006, at 1-
5. 
90 In a prior article, I envisioned a model for spectrum starting with a universal open entry 
privilege, cabined by tort-like and trademark-like liability rules. See Supercommons, supra 
note 12. The system described here could fit within that still-broader framework. 
91 See White Spaces Database Group, supra note 66. 
92 Some or all of these could be combined in a single company.  The White Spaces Database 
Group also refers to device registrars and stand-alone query services as “service providers.” 
93 Like the DNS root, the repository would likely be replicated across many servers for 
redundancy and geographical dispersal.  Unlike DNS, which has a single registry operator for 
each top-level domain, there might be more than one repository operator at the top level for 
the spectrum database.  Parallel registry operators would have to mirror their contents 
regularly to assure consistency.  
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such as the incumbent broadcasters and wireless microphone operators.  Another 
would be white space devices seeking secondary access to the spectrum. The 
registrar function parallels the competing registrars that users pay to register and 
maintain their domain names.  Finally, the query service would check a device 
request against the available capacity in the database.94  This is analogous to the 
resolver software that Internet service providers and personal computers use to 
determine the proper path to a domain name. 
The SND would adapt architectural elements of the DNS to spectrum.  At the 
core, the database would map blocks of spectrum to authorized users of that 
spectrum, just as the DNS maps domain names to servers on the Internet.  The 
database would be granular as to frequencies and location, at a minimum.  Before 
a device could operate, it would query the SND to identify available transmission 
opportunities.  The database would return one of two results: the requested 
spectrum allows no authorized transmitters, or information about the incumbent 
networks and devices authorized to operate there.  If the requested spectrum 
were empty, the device could register itself as operating in that band and 
location, and begin transmitting.  If the requested spectrum were occupied, the 
device could not operate unless it either met criteria for low-power or ultra-
wideband underlay operation consistent with the incumbent users, or it 
negotiated a license or lease from the incumbent.   
Like the DNS, the SND structure could be hierarchical.  This would avoid 
bottlenecks and facilitate greater local variation.  At the top would be redundant 
root servers, parallel to the multiple root servers for the DNS.  Local SND servers 
would query these root servers regularly and cache the results. Each SND server 
would therefore have an updated “map” of the spectrum in its geographical reach.   
Both the DNS and the White Space Database Group proposal separate the 
functions of registries (which store canonical data) and registrars (which 
interface with end-users and insert data into the registry).  This approach allows 
for competition and provides a check on the excessive power of a monopoly 
registry.  However, it is not without its own dangers.  For domain names, 
registrar competition is largely circumscribed to price.  There is little incentive 
for new or better service, so registrars engage in a “race to the bottom” to offer 
the cheapest registrations.  A high “wholesale” price for the .com domain registry 
exacerbated this error, giving registrars little room to maneuver.  Spectrum 
registrars should have flexibility to innovate, so long as they meet the basic 
technical and business requirements to participate in the process. 
For the system to operate, all dynamic devices would need unique identifiers, 
so they could be tracked and managed through the database.95  A certification 
process would need to be established to ensure that devices operate as specified, 
                                                        
94 This service might also be integrated into the registrar function.   
95 This would be one point of distinction between the new adaptive wireless devices and the 
legacy static devices entitled to protection. 
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including responding to shut-off commands from the database.  That process 
could be run directly by the FCC or delegated to private bodies, as with most 
communications equipment certification today.  
Devices would need the ability to communicate with the database, either 
through an existing Internet connection or via a dedicated wireless control 
channel. A wireless “control plane” for administrative communications would 
parallel the “out of band” architecture of the SS7 signaling network on the public 
switched telephone network (PSTN).96  On the Internet, signaling information 
uses the same physical channel as the information payload, but utilizes 
specialized protocols such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) for connecting 
networks and the DNS protocol for domain name resolution queries.97  The SND 
would need a separate wireless channel for administrative communication, 
because the entire purpose of the system is to establish a physical wireless 
connection in a particular spectrum block.  This channel could utilize existing 
unlicensed frequencies, which are already available throughout the United States, 
and in some cases globally harmonized.98   
Protected incumbent allocations in the SND could be classified in several 
ways.  Some existing uses would preclude any potentially interfering 
transmissions.  Military systems, radio astronomy bands, avionics, medical 
devices, and heavily utilized commercial systems such as cellular telephone 
service could be designated for maximum protection.99  Other bands might be 
subject to “easements” for low-power use, without permission from existing 
users.100  Others could be available on an unlicensed basis when not in use, as 
with the TV White Spaces under the FCC order.101 Still others might be available 
subject to negotiation with the incumbent.   The SND could manage interference 
because devices would need to query it prior to initiating transmissions.  If a 
device were determined to be operating improperly, the system would issue a “no 
channel available” message, preventing it from transmitting. 
                                                        
96 See Kevin Werbach, The Internet’s SS7 Network, RELEASE 1.0, Dec. 1999, available at 
cdn.oreilly.com/radar/r1/12-99.pdf. 
97 Kirk Lougheed, A Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) (1981), 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1105.txt. 
98 Revision of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit Unlicensed National 
Information Infrastructure (U-NII) Devices in the 5 GHz Band, ET Docket No. 03-122 (rel. 
June 4, 2003). 
99 It is worth pointing out, however, that even these systems, with the exception of radio 
astronomy, could at some point become more flexible and dynamic.  Public sector spectrum 
users could participate in the SND infrastructure on a case-by-case basis.  For radio 
astronomy, though, there is no way to negotiate with a quasar, so a strict zone of inclusion is 
needed. 
100 See Farber and Faulhaber, supra note 21. 
101 See White Spaces Order, supra note 59. 
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Technical standards for devices would need to be established. As noted 
previously, the IEEE 802.22 group is developing standards, but they envision a 
more limited White Space database compared to the broader SND vision 
sketched out here.  The standards adopted would significantly influence the scope 
and flexibility of the SND.  At an extreme, devices would have full flexibility in 
selecting spectrum bands, access models, and transmission modalities.  The 
reality is that such flexible radios are not yet feasible to build, let along affordable 
to sell, despite rapidly advancing research.  The functionality of devices will 
involve cost/performance tradeoffs.  The architects of the SND will have to 
determine how and where to restrict those tradeoffs.  For example, how often 
must devices query the database, and should baseline etiquettes be mandated for 
DSA devices to co-exist with each other? 
Furthermore, devices might operate on an ad hoc basis, handling all the 
spectrum access negotiation themselves, or they might be tied to fixed base 
stations.  The value of a fixed base station is that a mobile device need only find 
and establish contact with the base station, which can have a dedicated link to the 
SND.  The base station can ensure that the mobile device complies with the 
constraints of its authorization.  The mobile device would not be able to operate 
without confirmation from a base station, so if it were moved outside the 
specified transmission area, it would cease to transmit without authorization 
from another base station.  The architecture in this case would parallel that of 
cellular telephone networks.  Mobile phone handsets operate by locating a 
transmission tower, which authorizes them to communicate, assigns them 
temporary frequency slots, and handles “backhaul” of the communication onto 
the larger network backbone.   
B. Benefits 
The power of this system lies in its flexibility.  The same basic architecture 
could be applied in one set of frequencies (such as the former broadcast television 
bands) in a limited geographic area, or it could encompass the entire usable 
spectrum nationwide.  Moreover, the structure is agnostic between the two 
competing allocation mechanisms for more efficient spectrum use: property and 
commons.  If a frequency band is designated for unlicensed use, the SND would 
provide the technical restrictions such as power limits on that band, and 
authorize transmission.  If the frequency band is licensed, the SND would allow 
the licensee to specify terms for secondary access.  These could include anything 
from open entry so long as the licensee has priority and override capability, 
requirement of a reservation or “lease” for the system seeking access,102 or real-
time access payments using either a fixed or auctioned price.103 
                                                        
102 See Peha and Panichpapiboon, supra note 33; Maseng & Ulversoy at p. 3. Note that this 
could be the “unlicensed park” model suggested by spectrum property advocates, where an 
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The SND would allow for a new category of spectrum allocation that is neither 
property nor commons.  In this scenario, rather than designating frequencies as 
either licensed or unlicensed, as it does today, the FCC could establish a set of 
initial access algorithms for the SND. These algorithms could vary depending on 
the nature of the spectrum involved and the use cases.  For some very high 
“millimeter wave” frequencies, for example, the FCC has already established a 
reservation system, through which users can sign up to operate point-to-point 
links on a first-come, first-served basis.104  In other cases, the FCC might 
designate a primary user (such as a wide-area high-power system) and a category 
of secondary or unlicensed users with rights to operate below certain power 
thresholds or when the primary user was not.  The approach could be used for so-
called ATC (ancillary terrestrial component), in which frequencies designated for 
satellite uplink are re-used for terrestrial service through devices able to 
determine the angle of signal arrival.105  And it could be used for sharing 
spectrum with radar systems that rotate or operate only during circumscribed 
time periods.106 
As one concrete example, the FCC recently attempted to promote the 
deployment of a nationwide interoperable public safety wireless network using 
the so-called D Block of frequencies in the 700 MHz bands being vacated by 
analog UHF television channels.107  The Commission sought to auction the block 
subject to the condition that the winner construct a network capable of both 
commercial service and public safety use, with the public safety users having 
override capability in times of need.108  The funds from the auction were to be 
used to purchase equipment for the public safety users.109  The auction in 2008 
failed when no bidder offered the reserve price.110  The FCC is now evaluating 
                                                        
equipment vendor buys the spectrum and charges for devices.  The SND establishes the 
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other options, both for the 700 MHz D Block and for a nationwide interoperable 
public safety system. 
Under an SND model, the public safety goal could be achieved more readily.  
The FCC would designate frequencies in which public safety systems had a 
guaranteed override capability.  The simplest option would be then to allocate the 
system for auction to a private operator, who would get the spectrum subject to 
that limitation.  Or the spectrum could be made available as unlicensed, subject 
to the same condition.  The public safety override would then be incorporated 
into the technical rules for unlicensed devices approved by the FCC to operate in 
the band, and to the relevant technical standards.  As a variant, a royalty on each 
compliant device could be used to fund the purchase of public safety equipment, 
although that would require additional questions about the best funding 
mechanism for that goal.  In other words, the SND itself does not solve the public 
safety problem, but it creates a much larger toolkit for policy-makers to employ.   
A collateral benefit of this database-driven approach would be future-
proofing.  One of the great challenges of wireless communication is that as 
technology evolves and usage patterns change, bands may become more or less 
heavily used.  Incumbent systems, however, can be expensive to clear out of 
bands, even when they are not very active.  Clearing systems from the bands 
given to 2G and 3G cellular systems was extremely expensive, and in some cases 
the installed base of devices makes reallocation effectively infeasible. With an 
SND architecture, the FCC could change the allocation algorithm when 
conditions changed significantly.  Because all devices would be required to 
operate under the constraints of the SND, migration and adaptation would be 
automatic.111 
Compared to a pure property rights regime, the SND would be more effective 
because the SND functioned as a market-making intermediary.  Relying on 
individual spectrum owners to negotiate with potential entrants falls victim to the 
tragedy of the anticommons.112  There are many externalities and complications 
of interference and wireless utilization that property owners are ill-suited to take 
into account.113  A pure property system for spectrum is like the old host table for 
Internet addresses.  It becomes a bottleneck because it has no real-time global 
visibility.    
The SND would serve the same purpose as the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE): creating the trust and liquidity necessary for a well-functioning market.  
The NYSE assigns unique ticker symbols to each stock, but this is a relatively 
trivial aspect of its activity.  The more important functions of the NYSE include 
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serving as the locus for a set of rules, some private and some government-
imposed, that create well-defined rights as the basis for transactions. 
Collective mechanisms such as exchanges and government regulation become 
necessary when the efficient distribution of property rights is too difficult to 
achieve through bilateral transactions.  As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have 
noted, property functions both in rem (as a thing against he world) and in 
personal (as a bundle of rights attaching to an owner).114  Coase advocated 
property rights in spectrum by emphasizing the in personam rights in wireless 
equipment, rather than the notional in rem rights in spectrum frequencies.115  
The problem, as Merrill and Smith observe, is that the complexity and 
uncertainty of spectrum use rights makes private transactional regimes 
unworkable or far too limiting.116   The traditional, inefficient solution is 
command-and-control regulation.   The SND provides a multi-lateral mechanism 
to incorporate new spectrum allocation techniques based on commons and 
property rights.   
C. A Note About Governance 
The final and perhaps greatest challenge for implementation of an SND is the 
governance structure.  Domain names are the technical hinge around which the 
Internet rotates.  It has long been clear that control over domain name allocation 
was perhaps the closest proxy to a central governance function for the resolutely 
distributed Internet.  The US government, originally through the National 
Science Foundation, and later through the Department of Commerce and White 
House staff, exerts limited but explicit oversight over the DNS.  Operational 
decisions, generally reside with ICANN, a quasi-public, quasi-international body 
that as been a locus of controversy since its inception.117  
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This is not the place to catalog ICANN’s structural flaws and missteps.118  
Suffice it to say that governance for the DNS has not been a smooth process.  It is 
unlikely to be a simple one for spectrum.  That being said, many of ICANN’s 
challenges do not apply to the SND.  ICANN attempts the impossible challenges 
of being both public and private, as well as being both global and subject to 
national laws.   The SND would be squarely subject to the national regulatory 
authority of the FCC, but it would delegate many real-time decisions to private 
actors.  ICANN is nominally a technical coordination body, which finds itself 
engaged in significant policy debates, without sufficient procedural and 
substantive protections.119  The SND is an implementation mechanism for policy 
decisions made and enforced elsewhere, just like the DNS. 
CONCLUSION 
The SND vision adapts the three architectural attributes of the DNS to 
spectrum. 
First, the SND would allow a wireless device to ask the question, “Am I 
permitted to transmit here, and if so, how?”  Today, the answer is hardwired into 
the device.  Even an unlicensed device such as a WiFi node is strictly limited in 
the frequencies, power levels, and protocols it can employ, regardless of its actual 
local environment.  Resolution – the process of matching the physical device with 
the virtual communications space – is paired with the function of transmission.  
The DNS breaks this linkage for Internet traffic.  Special-purpose infrastructure 
handles the process of resolving the location of a network address.  Sending and 
receiving information is a separate function, which can employ a wide variety of 
technical mechanisms for efficient transmission.  The SND is similar because it 
establishes a special-purpose element of wireless communications infrastructure 
that is distinct from the transmission process itself.   
Second, the SND would be a fundamentally distributed system.  Wireless 
devices would query local copies of the database, just as Internet service 
providers query local domain name caches.  Consistency of data would need to be 
assured, but as the DNS demonstrates, that is not incompatible with multiple 
redundant copies or competing service providers.  For the White Space database, 
the FCC has not yet specified whether there can be multiple registrars or 
repositories. There is little disagreement on the value of competition between 
registrars, and allowing for multiple repositories could also have salutary effects.  
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The DNS has suffered because a single entity, NSI, was given control over the 
registry function for the .com top-level domain.120   
Third, the SND can be agnostic as to uses.  As described above, virtually any 
policy regime and type of application can be mapped into the database, so long as 
it is designed with sufficient flexibility and scalability to handle them.  Disputes 
over the boundaries of spectrum rights will not disappear, but they will be 
separated from disputes over the basic allocation of spectrum.   
Creating a DNS for spectrum would generate tremendous benefits.  Both 
wireless communication and Internet addressing are activities requiring conflict 
resolution.  The conflicts in wireless communication are between two or more 
users who wish to communicate, and the conflicts in Internet addressing are 
between two or more users who want the same identifier.  The ultimate goal, 
however, is not resolve the conflicts, but to promote communication and 
productive activity.  What mitigates interference going forward is deployment of 
smarter devices that can use spectrum in more efficient ways – through both 
property rights transactions and commons.   
The DNS removed the bottleneck of the host table system, and allowed for 
massive growth in the still-decentralized Internet.  If the SND could have a small 
fraction of that success in the spectrum domain, it would be a tremendous boon 
for economic activity, innovation, and open communication.   
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